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PETITION FOR REHEARING
Richard Raymond Smith, Sr., by and through his attorney, G.
Michael Westfall of the law firm of GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX &
WRIGHT, hereby petitions the Court for rehearing, pursuant to Rule
35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF POINTS OF LAW OR FACT WHICH PETITIONER
CLAIMS THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
1. There was no substantial, competent evidence to support the
trial court's factual findings that the proceeds of the sale of Mr.
Smith's premarital home were co-mingled and that Mr. Smith does not
have a premarital interest in the residence at 1098 South Fir
Street in Cedar City. The standard for review of the trial court's
factual findings is the "clearly erroneous" standard.

Hagan v.

Hagan, 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991).
2. Mrs. Smith's child support receivable accrued during the
parties' marriage

is a marital

asset that

considered in the division of marital property.

should

have been

The standard for

appellate review of this aspect of the case is a "correction of
error" standard, giving no deference to the trial court. Maxwell
v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1990).
3. Mr. Smith's 401K salaried savings plan should have been
valued as of the date of the parties' separation, prior to his
contribution of post-separation earnings to increase the value of
the account.

The standard for appellate review of this aspect of

the case is a "correction of error" standard, giving no deference
to the trial court.

Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (Utah App.

1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
To the extent it is necessary to include a Statement of the
Case in a Petition for Rehearing, Petitioner incorporates by
reference herein the Statement of the Case as set forth in the
Brief of Appellant in this matter.
On October 21, 1994, a Memorandum Decision was filed in this
matter, affirming the trial court's decision on all issues. Only
the claims relating to the home in Cedar City were addressed in the
written opinion.

All other issues were considered without merit.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In light of the length of the argument presented herein, no
summary of the argument is presented.
ARGUMENT
I.
TO THE EXTENT THE COURT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CEDAR CITY
HOME AS A MARITAL ASSET WAS BASED ON A FACTUAL FINDING THAT MARITAL
FUNDS WERE USED TO PURCHASE THE HOME, THAT CONCLUSION SHOULD BE SET
2

ASIDE SINCE THE FINDING THAT MARITAL FUNDS WERE USED TO PURCHASE
THE HOME WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The trial court has broad discretion to fashion an equitable
distribution

of

property

between

the parties.

However, in

fashioning that equitable distribution, the trial court must first
determine whether property is marital or separate (Burt v. Burt,
799 P.2d 1166 at 1172 (Utah App. 1990).
If the trial court's responsibility to distinguish between
separate and marital property is to be meaningful at all, the trial
court's classification of property as separate or marital must be
supported by substantial credible evidence.

As pointed out in

State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), "A finding not supported
by substantial competent evidence is clearly erroneous."
687.

Jd. at

In 50 W. Broadway Assoc, v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d

1162 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
A trial court's findings cannot be made up out of whole
cloth; substantial, competent evidence must exist that
supports the findings, and when a finding of fact is not
so supported, it must be rejected. Jd. at 1171
In this case there was no evidence to support a factual
finding that proceeds from the sale of the Mr. Smith's premarital
home were commingled with the marital estate.

Mrs. Smith's

testimony that she "believed" the money for the down payment for
purchase of the home came from the parties' joint account (T1 at
71) can hardly rise to the level of substantial, competent evidence
when she admitted that she did not know where the funds came from

References to the transcript of trial shall be designated by
the letter "T" followed by the page of the trial transcript.
3

to buy the home (T at 52). Mr. Smith then testified that he did
know where the funds came from to buy the home and that the funds
came from the proceeds of the sale of his premarital home in
Mission Hills, California (T at 518-519). Mrs. Smith admitted the
proceeds of the sale of his premarital home were Mr. Smith's
premarital funds (T at 431), in which she did not claim any
interest (T at 399) because the Mission Hills home was Mr. Smith's
premarital asset (T at 490). Mr. Smith also testified that the
monthly mortgage payments made to purchase the home came from his
Langley Credit Union checking account (T at 601-602) into which his
premarital and separate Air Force retirement had been deposited and
into which no other funds were deposited during the marriage (T at
499).

The evidence at trial supported only one conclusion, that

the funds used to purchase the Cedar City home were Mr. Smith's
separate property.
This Court's written opinion seems to suggest that, despite
Mrs. Smith's lack of knowledge and Mr. Smith's specific testimony,
Mr. Smith was still under an obligation to present documentary
evidence at trial to support his uncontradicted testimony. To the
extent that the Court of Appeals' decision is based on Mr. Smith's
failure to produce additional documentary exhibits at trial on
issues for which there was no real conflict in the evidence,
Petitioner requests that the Court of Appeals remand the case to
the trial court for the presentation of such additional documentary
evidence.

4

In this case the trial court erred when it concluded that Mr,
Smith did not have a separate property interest in the residence at
1098 South Fir Street (Record at 369).

Since the trial court's

decision to treat that property as marital property, in which each
party had an equal interest, was apparently based on its finding
that Mr, Smith had no separate property interest in the home, that
finding should be set aside and, in the absence of exceptional
circumstances which would justify including that separate asset in
the marital estate, the home should be awarded to Mr. Smith as his
sole and separate property, free and clear of any claim by Mrs.
Smith to the same.
II.
MR. SMITH'S CLAIMS THAT MRS. SMITH'S CHILD SUPPORT RECEIVABLE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN TREATED AS A MARITAL ASSET AND THAT THE VALUE OF
HIS 401K SALARIED SAVINGS PLAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN VALUED AS OF THE
DATE THE PARTIES SEPARATED HAVE MERIT AND THE TRIAL COURT'S RULINGS
ON THESE ISSUES SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVERSED.
The Court of Appeals is not obligated to address in its
opinion each issue presented on appeal. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d
886 at 888 (Utah 1989).

However, the Petitioner respectfully

requests that the Court reconsider at least two of the issues
presented by this appeal.

Those issues involve: 1) treatment of

Mrs. Smith's child support receivable accrued during the marriage,
and 2) the valuation date for the Mr. Smith's 401K salaried savings
plan.
A. The Child Support Receivable Accrued During the
Marriage Is An Asset Of The Marital Estate.
With regard to Mr. Smith's claim that the child support
5

receivable accumulated in Mrs. Smith's favor during the parties'
marriage is a marital asset, the trial court found simply that:
Plaintiff's accounts receivable for child support from a
prior marriage are not an asset of the marriage and not
something the court should distribute as part of this
action.
The court finds those to be a premarital
obligation of a prior husband and, as such, are not
appropriate for the court to distribute as an asset of
the marriage in this case. (Record at 363).
That finding is clearly in error. Child support is not a lump
sum debt on the date the support is ordered, payable in monthly
installments, as suggested by the trial court's characterization of
the receivable as a premarital obligation.

Each installment of

child support in this state is considered separately and becomes a
judgment, entitled to full faith and credit "on and after the date
it is due..." UCA §30-3-10.6(1).

Where a stepparent, whether on

his own behalf or on behalf of the marital partnership, has
supported the child during the marriage and at the time each
"judgment" arose, the trial court should at least consider those
"judgments" in dividing the marital estate, subject to valuation
and equitable allocation. Had the court ordered support been paid
and used to help support the child, thereby making available more
disposable income for the parties, any property purchased with the
additional disposable income would be clearly subject to award by
the Court.

The support receivable that has accrued should be

treated the same.

Petitioner has no objection to Mrs. Smith

receiving the asset. However, there should be a proper accounting
of the same as it relates to disposition of the entire marital
estate.
6

B.

The 401K Salaried Savings Plan Should Have Been
Valued As Of The Date The Parties Separated,

^The choice of laws issue presented in this case, relating to
treatment

of retirement

funds purchased

with

post-separation

earnings, should be resolved in favor of the law of the state where
the money was earned.
In California, post-separation earnings are separate property.
In Utah, property is generally valued as of the date of divorce.
If one spouse resides full time in one state and the other spouse,
while maintaining the common residence in that state, works and
maintains a second residence in a foreign state, a conflict between
the law of the two states as it relates to treatment of marital
assets should be resolved in favor of the state having the closest
contact with the asset.

In this instance, involving a 401K

salaried savings plan acquired with earnings from Mr. Smith's
California employer and maintained in that state, the law of the
state

of

California

should

govern.

Petitioner

therefore

respectfully requests that this Court rule that California law
should govern classification of post-separation contributions to
the 401k salaried savings plan as separate

property.

In the event this Court were to determine that California law
were not applicable to post-separation contributions to the 401K
salaried savings plan, the asset should still be valued as of the
date of separation to the extent that any increase in the value of
the savings plan resulted from the exclusive efforts of one party.
This Court has held that if one party has dissipated an asset then
7

the trial court may value the property at an earlier date, i.e.,
the date of separation. Peck v. Peck/ 738 P.2d 1050 (Utah App.
1987). It stands to reason that, if one party, through his or her
independent efforts has enhanced an asset, an alternate valuation
date may also be, and in this instance is, appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner respectfully submits that the evidence does not
support the trial court•s finding that the proceeds of the sale of
Mr. Smith's premarital home were co-mingled and that he did not
have a premarital interest in the home in Cedar City.

In

addition, two issues considered by this Court to be without merit,
i.e.,

consideration

of

the

accumulated

child

support

as

a

receivable of the marriage and establishing the valuation date for
the 401K salaried savings plan as the date of separation, should be
resolved in favor of Petitioner.

The trial court's findings and

order on each issue should be reversed.
Counsel

for Petitioner

respectfully

certifies

that this

petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
DATED this , *K7_

day of November, 1994.
GALLIAN, WESTFALL, WILCOX & WRIGHT

w~

/Q'. Mi^£el/#eTstMll
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing
document to Dale Sessions, Esq., P.O. Box 1586, Cedar City, Utah
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84720 and two copies to Jim Jensen, CHAMBERLAIN & HIGBEE, successor
counsel, at 250 South Main* P.O. Box 726, Cedar City, Utah 84720,
postage prepaid, this
<fcr day of November, 1994.
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